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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT'S GRANT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND DENIAL OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
ON THE ISSUE OF ADVERSE POSSESSION CONFLICTS WITH THE UNDIS-
PUTED FACTS AND WITH UTAH CODE ANN. 55 78-12-8, ET SEP., AND 
APPLICABLE LAW. 
A. Defendant's Position Is Consistent With The Statu-
tory And Common Law Basis For Extinguishment Of An 
Easement-By-Necessity Through Adverse Possession. 
Plaintiff contends that an easement-by-necessity, unlike other 
easements, cannot be extinguished by adverse possession because of 
public policy reasons and because easements-by-necessity are only 
extinguished when the necessity ceases or the easement holder re-
linquishes the easement. (Brief of Appellee, at 6-9.) Plaintiff 
further states that no authority exists "for the proposition that 
adverse possession can extinguish an easement-by-necessity." (Id.) 
In taking that position, plaintiff ignores Utah statutory law and 
the case law of other jurisdictions which recognize that an ease-
ment-by-necessity can be lost through adverse possession. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-8 (1953), for example, is all encom-
passing and permits extinguishment of all property interests 
through adverse possession. It provides: 
Whenever it appears that the occupant, or those under 
whom he claims, entered into possession of the property 
under claim of title, exclusive of other right, founding 
such claim upon a written instrument as being a convey-
ance of the property in question, . . . and that there 
has been a continued occupation and possession of the 
property included in such instrument . . . for seven years, 
the property so included is deemed to have been held 
adversely. . . . [Emphasis added.] 
This statute reflects a legislative policy to ensure that a pur-
chaser of real property who satisfies the statutory requirements 
of adverse possession for seven years is entitled to rely on the 
record title and that all competing rights to that property are 
extinguished. It prevents a long-standing, non-used easement from 
encumbering title and disrupting beneficial current use. Through 
the statute the legislature provided a means of protecting and pre-
serving property rights and interests when the adverse possession 
procedures prescribed by the legislature are followed. That policy 
is implemented and made clear by use of the phrase, "whenever it 
appears that the occupant." Use of the term "whenever" evidences 
a plain legislative intent to extinguish any competing property 
claims, whether they are based on another written instrument or 
a claimed easement-by-necessity, if the statutory procedures are 
met. Plaintiff ignores this express statutory language and cites 
case law from other jurisdictions that does not deal with broad 
statutory language like that adopted by our legislature in Sec-
tions 78-12-8, at seq. 
Also, contrary to plaintiff's contention that no authority 
exists to support extinguishment of an easement-by-necessity 
through adverse possession, plaintiff's position in this case is 
consistent with the case law from other jurisdictions. That law 
recognizes the right of an owner of a servient estate to extinguish 
an easement-by-necessity based on adverse possession. In Pencader 
Assoc, Inc. v. Glasgow Trust, 446 A.2d 1097 (Dela. 1982), for 
example, the Delaware Supreme Court reviewed the law relating to 
easements-by-necessity, including the circumstances in which such 
easements may be lost. Id. at 1099-1100. The court stated that 
easements-by-necessity may be abandoned and may also be extin-
guished by adverse possession, despite the general proposition 
that "a right to a way-of-necessity exists so long as the necessity 
from which it arose exists." Id. at 1100. According to the court, 
11
 [a] dverse possession by the owner of the servient estate can be 
found, provided all of the elements of adverse possession are es-
tablished." Id. Thus, applicable statutory and case law support 
defendant's position that an easement-by-necessity may be lost 
through adverse possession,1 especially as in this case where there 
is nothing in the county records showing any claim of easement that 
would alert the landowner that such a claim exists. 
B. The Seven-Year Statutory Period Applies To Adverse 
Possession Of An Easement-By-Necessity. 
Assuming an easement-by-necessity may be adversely possessed, 
plaintiff next advocates use of the 20-year common law prescrip-
tive easement period for purposes of showing adverse possession. 
(Brief of Appellee, at 10-14.) As he did before the trial court, 
plaintiff erroneously contends that cases from other jurisdictions 
show that the common law period of prescription applies, rather 
1
 The trial court in the present case recognized that an ease-
ment-by-necessity may be lost by adverse possession, but did not 
base its decision on Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-12-8, et seg. See Order 
attached as part of the Addendum to Brief of Appellant, at 5-6. 
than the seven-year period expressly prescribed by Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 78-12-8 and 78-12-12 (1953). Plaintiff's own cases show plain-
tiff is mistaken. First, in Beebe v. Swerda, 793 P.2d 442 (Wash. 
Ct. App. 1990), the court did not hold that the common law period 
for acquiring a prescriptive easement applies, as plaintiff 
suggests. The court merely held that "[w]hile it is legally 
possible for an easement to be terminated by adverse use for the 
prescriptive period. . . , the elements required to do so are the 
same elements that must be found in order to obtain an easement 
through adverse possession." JEd. at 446 (citations omitted). As 
to the "elements" required to be shown, the Court stated in the 
next sentence: 
To establish prescriptive rights by adverse possession, 
the claimant must show use which was open, notorious, 
continuous, uninterrupted, and adverse to the owner for 
the statutory period. 
Id. at 446-47 (emphasis added). Thus, the "elements" are open, 
notorious, continuous, uninterrupted, and adverse use, and it is 
the "statutory period" that governs. 
Second, in Mueller v. Hoblyn, 887 P.2d 500 (Wyo. 1994), the 
court did not hold that an easement may be extinguished by adverse 
possession pursuant to the common law "prescriptive period" of 
the state rather than the statutory period, as plaintiff states. 
(Brief of Appellee, at 11.) When the Court in Mueller referred to 
the "prescriptive period," that reference was to the "statutory 
period." See id. at 509. According to the court, "the ten year 
prescriptive period" is found in Wyo. Stat. § 1-3-103. Id. 
Additionally, plaintiff's arguments in the present case again 
ignore the express statutory language of Utah's adverse possession 
statute stating the period of time required to show adverse posses-
sion. Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-8 states that when "there has been a 
continued occupation and possession of the property included in 
such instrument . . . for seven years, the property so included is 
deemed to have been held adversely. ..." There can be no mistake 
that the legislature provided for a seven-year prescriptive period 
under Utah's adverse possession law "[w]henever it appears that the 
occupant . . . entered into possession of the property under claim of 
title, exclusive of other right, founding such claim upon a written 
instrument as being a conveyance of the property in question. . . ." 
See id. That seven-year period applies to appellant's claim of ad-
verse possession in the present case. 
The Utah Territorial case of Harkness v. Woodmansee, 26 P. 291 
(Terr. Utah 1891), does not change that fact. As demonstrated in 
defendant's initial brief, Harkness merely stands for the proposi-
tion that a party claiming a prescriptive easement cannot obtain 
such an easement under the statutory seven-year period for adverse 
possession. See Harkness, 26 P. at 293. The Harkness Court's 
2
 This Court will also note that in both Beebe and Mueller, 
the courts stated that an easement may be terminated through ad-
verse possession. Beebe, 793 P.2d at 446; Mueller, 887 P.2d at 509 
("An easement for a private road which has been 'definitively and 
functionally in existence' may be terminated by adverse possession 
when access is obstructed for the prescriptive period"). 
statement that the adverse possession statute "does not apply to 
rights of way or any other class of easement by prescription" can 
only be read in this way.3 Plaintiff cannot contest the fact that 
the Court's statement was made in the context of its resolution of 
the issue of whether a party claiming a prescriptive easement could 
do so within the seven-year statutory period for adverse posses-
sion, rather than the 20-year common law period for a prescriptive 
easement. See id. at 292-93. 
According to the Court in Harkness, the statute "does not 
. . . give the person relying upon it the title from seven years' 
possession alone; the presumption is made from the fact that the 
land was held adversely; and to make the holding adverse the land 
must have been protected by a substantial inclosure, or it must 
have been usually cultivated or improved, " and claimant "must have 
paid all taxes levied and assessed on the land according to law." 
Id. at 293. The plaintiff's claimed use in Harkness, for which a 
prescriptive easement was claimed, involved none of these statutory 
elements. Thus, when the Court stated in the next sentence that 
the "statute does not apply to rights of way or any other class of 
easement by prescription," the reasons for the statement are clear. 
Parties claiming easements, whether prescriptive or otherwise, do 
not "hold" land adversely, do not "protect" the land by a substan-
3
 Defendant in the present case does not seek a right of way 
or easement by prescription. Accordingly, Harkness, in any event, 
is inapposite. 
tial inclosure, do not usually cultivate or improve it, and do 
not pay taxes on the land. The fee owner of property, under the 
statutory procedure, is the only one who has the right to assert 
an adverse possession claim if those statutory conditions are sat-
isfied. Plaintiff's and the trial court's reliance on Harkness, 
based on an isolated statement taken out of context, therefore, 
misses the issue raised in Harkness. It also ignores the statutory 
language of Section 78-12-8, which provides for title by adverse 
possession after "seven years."4 
Plaintiff's argument that the 20-year common law prescriptive 
period should apply in the present case because plaintiff is the 
"interloper using appellant's land for ingress and egress" is 
similarly unavailing. (See Brief of Appellee, at 14.) Plaintiff 
relies on Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Moyle, 174 P.2d 148 
(Utah 1946), to suggest that cases founded on adverse possession 
require "complete and exclusive exercise of dominion by the claim-
ant, or interloper." (Brief of Appellee, at 13-14.) If, as plain-
tiff contends, defendant took her property subject to the claimed 
easement-by-necessity that existed back to 1902 (see Brief of 
4
 Even plaintiff acknowledges that the "doctrine of adverse 
possession relates to the acquisition of the basic fee title to a 
piece of property," while "prescriptive easements and easements by 
necessity, although different, relate to the use of another's title 
rather than obtaining fee title." (Brief of Appellee, at 13.) 
Thus, consistent with Harkness, a party claiming a prescriptive 
easement cannot obtain that easement in seven years under the ad-
verse possession statute, whereas a party claiming title through 
adverse possession can extinguish competing claims after seven 
years. 
Appellee, at 3), then defendant is the interloper or claimant. 
Plaintiff's argument based on Moyle is simply incorrect. Never-
theless, plaintiff's position again ignores the express statutory 
language of Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-8 which permits a landowner, 
such as defendant in the present case, to acquire title by adverse 
possession when the landowner's claim is founded "upon a written 
instrument." That is the theory on which defendant founds her 
claim. Principles applicable to a prescriptive easement have no 
place when a statutory adverse possession claim is asserted based 
on a deed. 
Thus, defendant was properly entitled to base her claim of 
adverse possession on statutory adverse use for the statutory 
seven-year period. The trial court erred in applying the common 
law 20-year period for a prescriptive easement to defendant's claim 
of adverse possession. That ruling must be reversed. 
C. Defendant Has Satisfied All Requirements To Show 
Adverse Possession Under Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-7-8, 
Et Seq. 
Although plaintiff attempts to show that defendant did not 
"use" her property "exclusive of other right" for the required 
period, that is not what the statute requires defendant to show. 
Section 78-12-8 states "[w]henever it appears that the occupant 
. . . entered into possession of the property under claim of title, 
exclusive of other right"--not exclusive of other use. The undis-
puted fact is that none of the deeds in the chain of title to 
plaintiff's and defendant's properties show any reference to plain-
tiff's claimed easement. (R 220, 1 29.) Thus, defendant entered 
into her property "exclusive of other right" within the meaning of 
Section 78-12-8. 
In any event, defendant's predecessor, Mr. Norton, confronted 
a Mrs. Mower who sought to cross Defendant's Property in 1982 and 
refused to allow the crossing unless a court order was obtained. 
Plaintiff admitted this fact. (Brief of Appellee, at 4.) In light 
of plaintiff's further admission that the "prescriptive clock" 
began to run at the time Mr. Norton refused to permit Mrs. Mower 
to cross Defendant's Property in 1982 (R 143), there can be no 
disagreement that defendant's and her predecessor's claim under 
Section 78-12-8 was "exclusive of other right" at least from that 
point on. Because plaintiff did not file his complaint until 1997 
(R 1-4), the seven-year statutory period for adverse possession 
therefore ran by the end of 1989, and plaintiff's claimed easement 
was extinguished. 
In addition, even if it is assumed that Section 78-12-8 re-
quires defendant to show "exclusive use" of her property for seven 
years, defendant has satisfied that requirement. Plaintiff, as 
stated, acknowledged the undisputed fact that "[s]ometime in 1982, 
members of Appellee's family sought to cross the Appellant's 
property to access Appellees' property, but were confronted by the 
owner at that time, Mr. Norton, who refused to allow the crossing 
unless a court order was obtained." (Brief of Appellee, at 4.) 
Because plaintiff further acknowledged before the trial court that 
this incident was "sufficiently adverse" to start the running of 
the period for adverse possession, as stated above, the seven-year 
period for defendant's adverse possession of the claimed easement-
by-necessity ran at least by the end of 1989. 
The question to be addressed by this Court is whether plain-
tiff presented any facts to dispute the fact that the "use" by 
defendant's predecessor during that seven-year period was "exclus-
ive of other right." Plaintiff attempts to show such "use" was 
not exclusive by stating that plaintiff presented facts to show he 
"used the easement on numerous occasions, some within seven years 
prior to this lawsuit being filed in July of 1997." (Brief of 
Appellee, at 15.) The fact, even if it is a fact, that plaintiff 
used the claimed easement from 1990 to 1997, does not refute de-
fendant's argument that defendant's and her predecessor's adverse 
possession was completed between 1982 and 1989. In addition, 
plaintiff's own citations to the record (R 231 ^ 1 & 3) do not 
present facts showing that plaintiff used the claimed easement from 
1982 to 1989.5 (See Brief of Appellee, at 3 & 15.) Also, it is 
5
 Plaintiff states only that he used the easement, but other 
than from 1990 to 1997, he does not state when. (Brief of Ap-
pellee, at 3 Sc 15.) Also, use by plaintiff to defeat adverse 
possession could only follow his acquisition of his property (the 
dominant estate) after he purchased his property in 1986, not when 
he was a boy. He has not shown that he had any right to the prop-
erty before 1986, and Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-8 refers to a claim 
of right by the owner of the property, "exclusive of other right," 
for purposes of adverse possession. Plaintiff has not shown he had 
any such "right" when he was a boy. 
undisputed that Mr. Norton put a lock on the portion of the fence 
that could be opened, and this was done to keep anyone from pulling 
back the fence to cross Defendant's Property. (R 213, 1 4.) Thus, 
no disputed issue of material fact exists with respect to the ex-
clusivity of defendant's use during the seven-year period from 1982 
through 1989, which is the statutory period claimed by defendant 
in this case.6 
Alternatively, to the extent it is determined that plaintiff, 
under his theory of "exclusive use," presented any facts to show 
that he used the claimed easement within the adverse possession 
period, then disputed issues of material fact exist as to whether 
defendant's and her predecessors' "use" was exclusive during that 
period. Defendant's affidavits presented to the Court showed that 
no one used the claimed easement from the mid-1960s until 1992. 
(R 216-18, M 12-15 & 18-19; 215, U 10.) The Nortons maintained 
a fence along the south side of the county road and never per-
mitted anyone to use any portion of defendant's property as an 
easement or otherwise during that time. (R 216, 1 13.) In addi-
tion, Mr. Norton put a lock on the fence in 1982 to keep anyone 
from pulling the fence back and to ensure that no one would cross 
the east end of defendant's property to get to the old house on 
6
 It is significant that the Court in Mueller v. Hoblyn, 887 
P.2d 500 (Wyo. 1994), a case cited by plaintiff, recognized that 
"the period of adverse possession began in 1990 when Coffee and 
Hoblyn demanded the easement be opened and Mueller refused." Id. 
at 509. Thus, under Mueller, an additional reason exists why the 
seven-year statutory period in the present case would have run by 
the end of 1989. 
plaintiff's property. (R 213, 1 4.) Plaintiff, therefore, could 
not have used the easement from 1982 until defendant purchased her 
property in 1992. Defendant also installed a metal gate with a 
lock shortly after she purchased the property so that only she and 
her family could access the property at the point plaintiff claims 
the easement started to run across Defendant's Property. (R 218-
19, H 24.) In addition, Cleon Rigby, a long-time resident of the 
area, never saw anyone pull back the fence along the county road 
or gain access through the fence to plaintiff's property. (R 215, 
11 10.) Therefore, the trial court, at the very least, committed 
error in granting plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the 
adverse possession issue. Disputed issues of material fact exist 
in this case, at the very least, which preclude the granting of 
summary judgment. 
Plaintiff next maintains that defendant's undisputed facts 
do not show that her use of the property was hostile and adverse. 
(Appellee's Brief, at 15-16.) Plaintiff bases his argument on 
cases from other jurisdictions that have nothing to do with the 
requirements of Utah's adverse possession statute.7 Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-12-9, entitled "What constitutes adverse possession under 
written instrument," provides: 
For the purpose of constituting an adverse possession 
7
 Plaintiff again cites Mueller v. Hoblyn, 887 P.2d 500 (Wyo. 
1994), and also Colouch v. Kramer, 813 P.2d 876 (Idaho 1991), in 
support of his argument. Neither involved statutory requirements 
like those in Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-12-8, et seq. 
by any person claiming a title founded upon a written 
instrument or a judgment or decree, land is deemed to 
have been possessed and occupied in the following cases: 
(1) Where it has been usually cultivated or im-
proved . 
(2) Where it has been protected by a substantial 
inclosure. 
(3) Where, although not inclosed, it has been used 
for . . . the purpose of husbandry, or for pasturage or 
for the ordinary use of the occupant. 
The facts presented by defendant indisputably satisfy the above 
statutory requirements, as demonstrated in defendant's initial 
brief. (Appellant's Brief, at 15-18.) Plaintiff has not even 
addressed these points. (See Brief of Appellees, at 15-17.) Thus, 
the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion for summary 
judgment on the issue of adverse possession.8 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT 
EXIST CONCERNING WHETHER PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMED EASEMENT WAS 
ABANDONED. 
In defendant's opening brief, defendant cited Utah law which 
recognizes that "an easement or right-of-way may be abandoned." 
(Brief of Appellant, at 19.) Plaintiff does not challenge defen-
dant's statements of the law. Instead, he attempts to distinguish 
the cases cited by defendant, primarily on the basis that those 
cases deal with express easements. (Brief of Appellee, at 23-26.) 
8
 It should also be noted, as shown by defendant's initial 
brief, that the facts presented by defendant show adverse use of a 
substantial nature. (Brief of Appellant, at 15-18.) 
Plaintiff, however, fails to show that the general principles of 
law adopted by the courts in those cases have no application to 
claims of abandonment of easements-by-necessity. 
That such principles apply equally to cases involving aban-
donment of easements-by-necessity is shown by Pencader Assoc. , Inc. 
v. Glasgow Trust, 446 A.2d 1097 (Dela. 1982), cited by defendant 
in her opening brief. (Brief of Appellant, at 19.) In Pencader, 
the court recognized the equitable defenses of adverse possession 
and abandonment, both of which can be invoked to extinguish a 
claimed easement-by-necessity. Id. at 1100. To establish abandon-
ment, the owner of the servient estate must show clear intent to 
abandon, "expressed or through acts of relinquishment, to abandon." 
See id. 
Although plaintiff attempts to distinguish the cases cited by 
defendant on their facts, it is significant that plaintiff does not 
take issue with defendant's position that "courts have found that 
evidence of an easement holder's non-use of an easement and acqui-
escence to the servient property owner's obstruction of an easement 
for a long period of time will justify a finding of abandonment." 
(See Brief of Appellee, at 23-26.) That is the principle invoked 
by defendant in support of her position on appeal that the trial 
court erred in light of the facts showing not only non-use, but 
also acquiescence by plaintiff and his predecessors to the obstruc-
tion of the claimed easement by defendant and her predecessors for 
over 3 0 years. Such acquiescence constitutes evidence of actual 
intent to abandon within the meaning of the law of abandonment, as 
shown by the cases cited by defendant. (See Brief of Appellant, 
at 20-21.) 
Sindler v. William M. Bailev Co., 204 N.E.2d 717 (Mass. 1965), 
for example, demonstrates that acts similar to those in the present 
case may be used to show "an intention never again to make use of 
the easement in question." See id. at 719-20. The facts upon 
which an intent to abandon in Sindler were based include (a) dis-
appearance of wooden planks that formed a bridge across a brook, 
(b) subsequent widening of the brook and erosion of its banks, 
(c) respondent's and its predecessor's standing by for 35 years 
while the disputed area was confined to the use of the owners of 
the parcel upon which the easement was located, and (d) acquies-
cence by the respondent in the construction of a chainlink fence 
which enclosed the disputed area for several years and the subse-
quent placing of a chain across the entrance to the disputed area 
to prevent its use by persons other than those working in the 
factory on the premises of the servient estate. Id. at 719-20. 
Also, plaintiff overlooks key facts upon which the court 
in Albanese v. Dominianni, 281 A.D. 768, 118 N.Y.S.2d 347 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1953), based its decision of abandonment. One of those 
important facts was "plaintiff's acquiescence in defendants' con-
struction and maintenance of a curbing, metal fence, and garden 
on defendants' property." Id. at 768. Although plaintiffs simi-
larly constructed curbing, a wooden fence, and a garden within 
the easement area for more than 2 0 years, Albanese stands for the 
principle upon which defendant relies in the present case to show 
abandonment--acquiescence by the owner of the dominant estate in 
the obstruction of a claimed easement by the owner of the servient 
estate for a long period of time. Non-use coupled with failure 
to object or "omission evincing a clear intent to abandon, or 
2) adverse possession by the servient estate" may result in aban-
donment of the claimed easement. See Canadian Nat. Ry. v. Sprague, 
609 A.2d 1175, 1179 (Me. 1992). 
Finally, although plaintiff contends that the facts cited by 
defendant in her opening brief merely show non-use of plaintiff's 
claimed easement-by-necessity for many years, plaintiff fails again 
to address defendant's full position. Those same facts, as stated 
by defendant in her opening brief, show omissions and acquiescence 
from the late 1930s or early 1940s which are plainly inconsistent 
with any intention on the part of plaintiff and his predecessors 
to make further use of their property or the easement. (See Brief 
of Appellant, at 21-24.) By way of summary, the facts show the 
following: 
(a) When the occupants of plaintiff's property 
moved from the property in the late 1930s or early 1940s, they 
left the home to deteriorate to the point that animals began 
to inhabit the home. 
(b) From the late 1930s or early 1940s, no one 
lived in the old home and no one used plaintiff's property or 
the easement claimed by plaintiff, nor did anyone maintain 
the house or property until a member of plaintiff's family 
attempted to cut across a portion of defendant's property 
and was confronted by Mr. Norton in 1982. 
(c) From at least the mid-1960s until the present 
time, the claimed easement was fenced off and subsequently 
blocked by a locked gate. Neither defendant nor her prede-
cessors ever let anyone use that portion of their property 
for access to the old house or for any other purpose. 
(d) A huge rock pile exists on the south side of 
the dilapidated house on plaintiff's property and makes that 
portion of the property unusable. 
(e) When the Nortons purchased defendant' s property 
in the mid-1960s, it was obvious that plaintiff's property 
had long since been abandoned. There was no evidence at that 
time of an easement or lane across the eastern portion of 
defendant's property to the old house. 
(f) Even plaintiff acknowledged that the old, 
dilapidated house on his property had been "abandoned." 
(Brief of Appellant, at 21-24.) 
Also, as demonstrated, plaintiff and his predecessors stood 
by for over 30 years, from at least the mid-1960s until plaintiff 
filed the present action, and acquiesced in defendant's and her 
predecessors' blocking of the claimed easement by constructing a 
fence, placing "No Trespassing" signs on the fence, later placing 
a lock on the fence, plowing and planting grass within the claimed 
easement area, and grazing animals within that area. (See Appel-
lant's Brief, at 23.) Plaintiff has not addressed these key and 
most significant facts.9 
In short, the trial court erred in granting plaintiff's motion 
for summary judgment that the easement was not abandoned. Disputed 
issues of material fact exist regarding abandonment. Defendant's 
facts show not only non-use of the claimed easement since the late 
1930s or early 1940s, but conduct by plaintiff and his predecessors 
that is plainly inconsistent with any intention to make further use 
of the property for nearly half a century. Plaintiff and his pre-
decessors acquiesced in defendant's and her predecessors' obstruc-
tion of the easement for over 30 years. Even when Mr. Norton con-
fronted a Mrs. Mower and told her that she had no right to trespass 
on defendant's property, she did not claim that she had an easement 
9
 Also, instead of showing that no disputed issues of material 
fact exist, plaintiff attempts to argue or present a different ver-
sion of certain facts. Examples include the following: 
(a) Plaintiff acknowledges that the house had been abandoned, 
"but argues that defendant assumes that if the house is abandoned, 
the property must also be abandoned. ..." (See Brief of Appellee, 
at 21.) 
(b) Plaintiff has testified that he used the property for 
hunting, recreation and pasturing his animals. (Id.) This is 
contrary to defendant's facts and, even then, does not state when 
such activities allegedly occurred. (See R 217-19, HH 15, 23 and 
25; R 216, % 13; R 215, 1 10.) 
(c) Plaintiff acknowledges the existence of the huge rock 
pile, but states, "[h]ow is this clear and unequivocal evidence of 
Appellee's intent to abandon the easement? Is it possible that 
Appellee simply does not want to incur the cost of removing the 
rock pile?" (Brief of Appellee, at 22.) 
across the eastern portion of defendant's property. Accordingly, 
the district court's summary judgment must be reversed and the 
case remanded for trial on the issue of abandonment. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated abov^ e, the trial court's summary 
judgment against defendant should be reversed in its entirety and 
summary judgment should be entered in defendant's favor, establish-
ing that plaintiff's claimed easement was extinguished by adverse 
possession. In the alternative, the Court should reverse the judg-
ment against defendant and order that defendant's claims of adverse 
possession and abandonment be tried. 
Respectfully submitted this 2.5 day of August, 2002. 
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